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A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO REFORMING THE 
CANADIAN OUTBOUND TAX SYSTEM: BROADER 
ACCRUAL AND FULL EXEMPTION 
Jinyan Li* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Advisory Panel of Canada’s System of International Taxation (the 
“Panel”) published its consultation paper in April 2008, entitled 
Enhancing Canada’s International Tax Advantage.1 The Panel’s mandate 
is “to make recommendations to guide the government in establishing an 
international tax policy framework,” as well as “to improve the 
competitiveness, efficiency and fairness of Canada’s system of 
international taxation, minimize compliance costs for businesses, and 
facilitate administration and enforcement by the Canada Revenue 
Agency.” The Consultation Paper identifies the policy framework to 
include attracting foreign investment, competitiveness, simplicity, and 
fairness. It recognizes that capital export neutrality (CEN), capital import 
neutrality (CIN) and capital ownership neutrality (CON) may influence the 
choice between an exemption system and a foreign tax credit system.2 The 
Panel expressed a preference for a broader exemption system.  
* The authored benefited from discussions with Scott Wilkie and comments from Neil
Brooks on an earlier draft. She thanks them for their insights, but does not wish to 
attribute any of the specific views to either of them.  The author also thanks He Huang, 
LL.M candidate at Osgoode, and Shane Litvack, BLG Fellow, for their research 
assistance.  
1 The Consultation paper is available at www.apcsit-gcrcfi.ca.  
2 The CEN generally requires current taxation of foreign income with a full credit for 
foreign taxes paid. To the extent that foreign taxes are less than domestic tax, the tax base 
is shared between the source country and the residence country of the shareholder. CIN 
and CON call for the primary or exclusive taxation of business income in the source 
country. This is often referred to as the “exemption” system or territorial system. In 
practice, no country has adopted a pure credit system or a pure exemption system. The 
mix of the two systems attempts to balance between CEN and CIN/CON.   
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This article discusses the general approach to tax reform and the specific 
questions about redesigning the outbound tax system. The main thesis is 
that the neutrality theories (CIN, CEN and CON) are not particularly 
determinative or even that useful in thinking about the reform questions. A 
principled approach along the lines of fundamental tax principles and tax 
expenditure analysis should be seriously considered. The ability-to-pay 
and tax entitlement are fundamental principles underlying the existing 
outbound tax system. No serious suggestion has been made anywhere that 
the re-designed system should be fundamentally different. As such, these 
principles should continue to apply. Situating the exemption system as part 
of the normative system as opposed to a tax expenditure may redirect the 
debate to some different questions. This article supports a broader accrual 
system for foreign portfolio income and a full exemption of dividends 
received from “foreign affiliates” of Canadian resident corporations. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
The current outbound tax system contains many complex rules that look at 
the character of foreign income and whether the income is earned directly 
or indirectly through a foreign intermediary (typically a corporation). 
Income earned directly by resident taxpayers (individuals and corporations 
alike) is currently taxable, subject to relief for foreign taxes.3 Income 
earned through a foreign corporation is taxed in Canada in a variety of 
ways, depending on whether: the foreign corporation is a “foreign 
affiliate” (FA), the FA is resident in a treaty country, the foreign income 
earned by the FA is “foreign accrual property income” (FAPI) or active 
business income, the FA is “controlled” by a Canadian resident (CFA), 
and the Canadian shareholder is a corporation or an individual.  
Generally speaking, income earned through a foreign affiliate is 
“deferred” from Canadian tax until the corporation pays dividends to its 
Canadian shareholder. If the shareholder is a Canadian corporation, the 
dividends are taxed differently depending on the character of income and 
whether the foreign country has a tax treaty with Canada. Dividends are 
3 S.2(1), s.3 and s.126 of the Canadian Income Tax Act (ITA). 




“exempt” if the foreign affiliate is in a treaty country and the income is 
derived from active businesses (the “exemption system”).4  Dividends are 
“taxable” in other cases with relief for foreign withholding tax on the 
dividends as well as the foreign underlying corporate tax (the “deferral 
with credit” system).5   
 
The character of the foreign income earned by a foreign affiliate generally 
determines the application of the accrual system or the deferral system: 
FAPI is subject to accrual, non-FAPI is eligible for deferral. Within the 
deferral system, the character of foreign income as well as the existence or 
absence of a tax treaty determines whether the dividends are subject to the 
exemption treatment or the credit treatment.6  
  
A. FOREIGN ACTIVE BUSINESS INCOME 
 
Foreign active business income earned directly by a Canadian resident 
individual (CRI) or Canadian resident corporation (Canco) is currently 
taxed in Canada, subject to foreign tax credit relief. On the other hand, 
foreign business income earned through a foreign corporation is not 
taxable in Canada when the income is earned. Canadian tax is deferred 
until the foreign corporation pays dividends to Canadian shareholders. The 
dividends may be taxed as: 
(a) ordinary “non-business income” where the foreign corporation 
does not qualify as a “foreign affiliate” or where the shareholder is 
an individual;  
(b) “exempt dividends” where the foreign corporation is a foreign 
affiliate resident in a country that has a tax treaty or Tax 
Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) with Canada and the 
shareholder is a Canadian corporation (the “exemption system”);    
(c) “taxable dividends” where the foreign affiliate is in a non-treaty 
country and the shareholder is a Canadian corporation (the 
“deferral with credit” system).  
 
                                                 
4 S.90 and s.113(1)(a) of the ITA. 
5 S.90 and s.113(1)(b)(c) of the ITA. 
6 S.113(1)(b)(c) of the ITA. 
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Under the “exemption system”, foreign taxes are not recognized in 
Canada. Under the credit system, Canada provides a direct foreign tax 
credit for withholding tax and an indirect credit for the underlying 
corporate tax.  In practice, however, taxable dividends are not actually 
taxed in Canada after the deduction for direct and indirect foreign tax 
credits.7 
 
Table 1: Canadian taxation of foreign active business income earned 
through a foreign corporation (FC) 
 
            Status of FC 
Canadian  
investor                    






- current tax on FC’s 
income? 
- tax on dividends from FC? 
 
No, not within s.2(1) or 
(3) 
Yes, s.126 relief 
 
No 






- current tax on FC’s 
income? 
- tax on dividends from FC? 
  
No  











B. FOREIGN ACCRUAL PROPERTY INCOME (FAPI) 
 
FAPI earned through a foreign corporation is subject to accrual taxation in 
Canada, but only if the foreign corporation is a CFA or a “foreign 
investment entity” (FIE) (i.e., the income is derived primarily from 
portfolio investment) of a Canadian corporation or individual. In other 
cases, the deferral treatment applies to FAPI as well. Dividends paid out of 
FAPI are “taxable dividends”, eligible for direct and indirect foreign tax 
credits. To the extent that the FAPI is taxed on an accrual basis, the 
dividends paid out of pre-taxed FAPI are generally “tax-free” in Canada.8 
                                                 
7 According to some practitioners, why would anyone bring back taxable dividends if 
they end up being taxed in Canada.  The Consultation Paper indicates (at 14) that there is 
no reliable data showing the amount of Canadian tax actually collected on taxable 
dividends. 
8 S.91(5) and s.113(1)(b)(c) of ITA. 




Table 2: Canadian taxation of FAPI earned through a foreign 
corporation (FC) 
 
            Status of FC 
 
Canadian investor        




- Accrual tax of FAPI? 
- dividends from FC taxable? 
 
Yes, s.91(4) relief  
Yes, s.126 FTC 
 
No 






- Accrual tax of FAPI? 
- dividends from FC taxable? 
  
Yes, s.91(4) and (5) relief  











C. BASIC STRUCTURE 
 
In summary, the Canadian outbound tax system contains the following 
basic elements:   
a) Worldwide taxation of residents on foreign income earned directly; 
b) Accrual taxation of FAPI earned through a controlled foreign 
affiliate or foreign investment entity; 
c) Deferral treatment of income earned through foreign corporations 
(with the exception of the accrual treatment of FAPI);  
d) “Exemption” or “credit” treatment of dividends from foreign 
affiliates, distinguished on the basis of a tax treaty or TIEA and the 
character of foreign income.9    
 
As mentioned earlier, there is little actual difference between the 
“exemption” and “credit” system in terms of Canada’s tax revenue 
collection. In the absence of empirical evidence to the contrary, it is 
reasonable to assume that taxable dividends are repatriated only when they 
                                                 
9 For an overview, see Li, Cockfield and Wilkie, International Taxation in Canada 
(2006), chapters 11 and 13. For some insights on the historical background of the current 
rules, see Alan Short, “Conference on the Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation 
(Canadian Tax Foundation) 1967, 329; and Alan Short,  “International Tax Provisions,” 
Twenty-Second Tax Conference (1970) 171. 
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carry enough credits to eliminate any Canadian tax payable or when the 
Canadian corporation is not in a tax-paying position in the first place.  
Therefore, in effect, dividends from foreign affiliates are not taxed at the 
corporate level. 
 
III. PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
 
There is no simple general principle that applies to all international tax 
policy issues. However, there are several principles that apply to the 
current system, the most basic of these principles are arguably the ability-
to-pay and tax entitlement.   
 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES  
 
The Ability-to-Pay principle.  The ability-to-pay principle is the foundation 
of progressive personal income taxation.10 Since taxes are ultimately borne 
by individuals, it has been generally considered fair to spread the tax 
burden among individual taxpayers on the basis of comparative economic 
well-being, often referred to as ability-to-pay. For example, the Carter 
Commission regarded equity (or fairness) as a major policy objective.11 
The Carter Commission distinguished between “horizontal equity,” which 
requires that persons “in similar circumstances” bear the same taxes, and 
“vertical equity,” which requires that persons in different circumstances 
bear “appropriately different” taxes.12 Both dimensions of equity required 
that tax be levied in accordance with “ability to pay.”  Although there are 
many occasions when ability-to-pay must yield to other policy 
                                                 
10 See Canada, Royal Commission on Taxation (Chair: K. Carter), Report, vol. 4 (Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer, 1966 (hereinafter “Carter Report”),  at 483-84; and Fair Tax 
Commission (Ontario), Fair Taxation in a Changing World (University of Toronto Press, 
1993), at 44-48.  See also Edwin Seligman, Essays in Taxation (The Macmillan 
Company, 1931), 338 ; and Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni, and Stephen E. Shay, 
“Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-pay Case for Taxing Worldwide 
Income” 5 Flf. Tax Rev. 299. 
11 This is the view of the Carter Commission. See Carter Report, ibid,  vol. 1, at 4-5.  
12 Ibid, vol. 1, 4-5. This view is generally shared. See Peter Hogg, Joanne Magee and 
Jinyan Li, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law (6th ed) (Carswell 2006), ch.2. 




considerations (such as efficiency, simplicity and competitiveness), it is 
often given weight in the domestic tax policy process.   
 
The ability-to-pay principle underlies the design of the basic outbound tax 
rules.  The worldwide tax regime required by section 3 of the Income Tax 
Act  (i.e., including a resident’s foreign income in computing the 
taxpayer’s income) reflects this principle. An income tax based on the 
ability-to-pay principle is inherently global.13  The same principle also 
demands that foreign taxes paid on the foreign income reduces the 
taxpayer’s ability-to-pay and should be allowed to reduce the Canadian tax 
liability.  
 
The ability-to-pay principle generally applies at an individual level and not 
to corporations.  Corporations and other intermediaries are legal entities 
used to earn income for the benefit of individuals.  Income taxes paid by 
corporations are generally shifted to shareholders, workers, suppliers, and 
customers.  The residence of a legal fiction (i.e., a corporation) is artificial, 
and the income level of a corporation bears little connection with the 
ability to pay of its shareholders.    
 
Corporations are separate entities.  Corporations are “persons” under the 
Income Tax Ac. They are generally regarded as taxpayers separate from 
their shareholders. A corporation is a Canadian resident if it is 
incorporated in Canada or has its place of central management and control 
in Canada. Canadian resident corporations are taxable on their foreign 
income earned directly.  However, if foreign income is earned through a 
foreign corporation, that income is generally not taxable in Canada to the 
Canadian shareholder.  
 
The “separate entity” principle can effectively cancel the ability-to-pay 
principle if left unchecked: individuals can choose to earn foreign income 
through a non-resident corporation. The FAPI rules function as such 
checks and protect the integrity of the ability-to-pay in Canada.  
 
                                                 
13 See Fleming, Peroni and Shay, supra note 10; Carter Report, supra note 10, at 503; 
McIntyre, infra note  38; David Bradford, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (2d ed., rev. 
1984), at  90; Musgrave, “Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International 
Taxation” 26 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 1335 (2001), at 1336-7.   
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The Tax Entitlement Principle.   The tax entitlement principle calls 
for an equitable sharing of the international tax base between nations in 
accordance with each nation’s tax entitlement.14 The theoretical 
foundations for this principle are the economic allegiance theory, ability to 
pay, and the benefit theory.15   
 
Under this principle, a residence country is entitled to tax foreign income 
on the grounds that: (a) residents owe tax allegiance in return for the rights 
and privileges that they receive as residents (including those afforded to a 
corporation by its country of registration); (b) the tax is, in nature, a 
payment for productivity-enhancing benefits provided by the country of 
residence to its own factors of production prior to transfer abroad; (c) it is 
necessary to achieve equitable tax treatment of resident taxpayers by 
making all income, wherever earned, subject to tax, consistent with the 
accretion [ability to pay] principle.16 A source country is entitled to tax 
income arising within their borders, including that accruing to foreign 
investors.  A country is permitted “to share in the gains of foreign-owned 
factors of production operating within its borders, gains that are generated 
                                                 
14 The principle of tax entitlement underlies the concept of “inter-nation equity”, which 
was originally  developed and advocated by Peggy Musgrave and Richard Musgrave.  
See Peggy B Musgrave and Richard A. Musgrave, ‘Inter-Nation Equity,’ in Richard M. 
Bird and John G. Head, eds., Modern Fiscal Issues (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1972) 63-85, at 68; Peggy B. Musgrave and Richard A. Musgrave, ‘Fiscal 
Coordination and Competition in an International Setting,’ in L. Eden, ed., Retrospectives 
on Public Finance (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991) 61-85, at 65-6;  Peggy 
Musgrave, “Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International Taxation,” 
Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 26 (2001) 1335-1356; and Peggy Musgrave, “Combining Fiscal 
Sovereignty and Coordination: National Taxation in a Globalizing World,” in Inge Kaul 
and Pedro Conceicao, ed. The New Public Finance Responding to Global Challenges 
(Oxford University Press 2006) 167.  Other scholars and their work include: Nancy 
Kaufman, ‘Fairness and the Taxation of International Income,’ Law and Policy in 
International Business 29 (1998):145-203; Klaus Vogel, ‘World-wide vs. Source 
Taxation of income – A Review and Reevaluation of Arguments,’ in Influence of Tax 
Differentials on International Competitiveness: Proceedings of the VIIIth Munich 
Symposium on International Taxation (Deventer, Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers 1991), 160-61; Jinyan Li, Taxation in the Age of Electronic Commerce: A 
Comparative Study (Toronto, Canadian Tax Foundation, 2003), ch.12. 
15  Kaufman, ibid,  at 188 (suggesting that Musgrave’s entitlement principles need a 
foundation in a theory of justice and that “economic allegiance” should be the foundation 
of a  nation’s competence in taxation and inter-nation equity). 
16 See, e.g., Peggy Musgrave, “Combining Fiscal Sovereignty and Coordination” (2006), 
supra note 14, at 168. 




in cooperation with its own inputs, whether they be natural resources, an 
educated or low-cost workforce, or proximity to a market.”17 In other 
words, source country’s tax entitlements arise from “economic rent” –the 
source country’s tax “may be thought of as a national return to the leasing 
of these complementary factors to nonresident investors or temporary 
workers,” or a quid pro quo payment for cost-reducing, profit-enhancing 
services provided by the source country.18  Source taxation in accordance 
with the tax entitlement principle has been “the bedrock of most 
international tax treaties.”19   
 
Under the tax entitlement principle, Canada is entitled to tax its Canadian 
residents in respect of their foreign income. However, this entitlement is 
secondary to the foreign source country’s entitlement. The international 
consensus is that the source country’s tax entitlement to business profit is 
much stronger than to investment income. For example, Article 5 of the 
OECD Model Convention allows the source country unlimited scope of 
taxation once the threshold of permanent establishment is satisfied. In 
contrast, the source country’s tax jurisdiction over dividends, interest, 
royalties and capital gains is restricted (Art.10 and Art. 11 of the OECD 
Model Convention) or totally removed (e.g., Art 12 of the OECD Model 
convention). The Canadian outbound tax rules generally recognize the 
source country’s prior tax claim by allowing foreign taxes be reduced from 
Canadian tax otherwise payable. 
 
Tax Neutrality.  As a general principle, taxes should be neutral.20 
Canadian outbound tax rules are thus required not to distort Canadian 
companies’ decision to invest at home or abroad. It could also be stretched 
to mean that Canadian tax rules should not impede Canadian companies’ 
competitiveness by imposing tax costs that are not borne by their 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Peggy Musgrave, “The OECD Model Tax Treaty: Problems and Prospects,” Columbia 
J. of World Business (Summer 1975) 29. 
20 The Carter Commission argued, and many experts agree, that the tax system should be 
“neutral”. What is meant by a neutral system is one that is “designed to bring about a 
minimum change in the allocation of resources within the private sector of the economy”: 
Carter Report, supra note 10, vol. 2, 8. 
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competitors from other countries.21 In international tax debates, this 
principle of neutrality has been largely discussed in terms of CEN, CIN 
and recently CON.   
 
Tax expenditures versus normative system.  The Income Tax Act contains 
two general types of provisions: normative or benchmark provisions and 
tax expenditures. Tax expenditure provisions are generally those that 
deviate from the norm in order to promote a specific policy objective.22 A 
tax expenditure is evaluated on its merits as if it were a separate assistance 
programme by asking: How much does it cost? Does it fulfil its 
objectives? Who benefits from it? Because tax expenditure provisions are 
intended to be non-neutral, it is futile to justify them on ground of 
neutrality.  
  
B. RATIONALIZING THE FAPI ACCRUAL REGIME 
 
The FAPI regime applies, in general, income that is mobile or lacks any 
“intrinsic” or “natural” connection with the source country. It can be 
earned through the “simple formal expedient of foreign incorporation”23 in 
tax friendly jurisdictions. The FAPI rules are thus “anti-avoidance rules” 
intended to protect the Canadian tax base.  The scope of the Canadian tax 
base is determined normatively by the ability-to-pay principle and tax 
entitlement principle. The ability-to-pay principle requires taxpayer’s 
income to include foreign income. Because of the inherently mobile nature 
of FAPI, the foreign source country’s tax entitlement over FAPI is limited. 
Canada, as a residence country of the investor, shares the jurisdiction to 
                                                 
21 Scott Wilkie, Robert Raizenne, Heather I. Kerr, and Angelo Nikolakakis, “The Foreign 
Affiliate System in View and Review,” Corporate Management Report (Canadian Tax 
Foundation, 1993), 2:1-72 (noting that a basic issue in outbound taxation is whether 
“whether it is important to try to ensure that Canadians conducting foreign commercial 
operations through foreign corporations are not impeded by business costs, in the form of 
Canadian taxes, that their competitors do not face”. 
22Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures (1973) and Surrey 
and McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (1985) are the seminal works on the topic. 
23 An exempt surplus account also includes inter-affiliate dividends traced to exempt 
surplus, tax-free portion of capital gains, as well as taxable capital gains from the 
disposition of “excluded property” (largely assets used in carrying on active business 
activities). 




tax FAPI.  The accrual taxation of FAPI is also consistent with the 
principle of neutrality as it removes the tax incentives for artificially 
“sourcing” FAPI to a foreign jurisdiction.24 
 
C. RATIONALIZING THE DEFERRAL REGIME 
 
The deferral regime is consistent with the separate entity principle. The 
foreign source country’s tax entitlement to business income takes 
precedence over Canada’s entitlement to tax the Canadian corporation. 
Canada taxes such income only when it is paid to individual shareholders 
and applies the ability-to-pay principle at this level. In essence, the 
exemption system recognizes the foreign country’s entitlement to tax the 
income25 and Canada’s entitlement to tax the individual investors.   
 
The deferral system arguably violates the principle of neutrality as it 
favors earning foreign income through a foreign subsidiary as opposed to a 
foreign branch and favors earning foreign income as opposed to Canadian 
income. In effect, however, such tax bias disappears where the foreign 
income is taxed in the foreign country at a level equal to the Canadian tax. 
When a country’s tax rate is much lower than the Canadian rate, if the 
investment conditions are similar in Canada and the foreign country, the 
deferral system encourages investment in the foreign country. If the 
investment conditions are different at home and abroad, it is difficult to 
assess the effect of the tax rules on the investment location.26 
 
D. NATURE OF THE EXEMPTION SYSTEM  
 
The current exemption system can be rationalized as a proxy for the 
deferral with credit system, a tax expenditure, or a normative rule. Under 
                                                 
24 This has been typically phrased as promoting CEN. See Wilkie at al, supra note 21, at 
2:27. 
25 Ibid., at 2:10. 
26 For a recent study by the OECD, see Tax Effects on Foreign Direct Investment – 
No.17: Recent Evidence and Policy Analysis (2007) (OECD, Paris).  
  
12                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 08 
 
the proxy view,27 where a foreign country’s tax system is comparable to 
Canada’s (this is assessed by the existence of a tax treaty), the credit 
system will not generate any further tax revenue in Canada. Hence, it is 
simpler to just “exempt” the dividends from Canadian tax.  This view 
assumes the deferral with credit as the “normative system”. Historically, 
this view is correct. 
 
Under the tax expenditure view,28 the exemption system is a deliberate 
violation of tax neutrality in order to enhance the competitiveness of 
Canadian companies. The recent broadening of the exemption system to 
countries that have concluded a Tax Information Exchange Agreement 
(TIEA) with Canada seems to view the exemption system as an 
“inducement” to encourage tax information exchange with tax haven 
jurisdictions. The tax expenditure view also assumes that the deferral with 
credit is the norm. The underlying assumption is that there must be an 
underlying normative tax system and an expected level of tax in the 
foreign country in order for that country to become entitled to the cession 
of Canadian tax. However, the extension of the exemption system to TIEA 
countries (zero or low-tax jurisdictions) seems to undermine such an 
assumption.   
 
Can the exemption system be viewed as part of the normative system?  If 
the analysis is focused on the formal rules of the Income Tax Act, the 
answer is “no”:  Dividends from a FA are included in income (s.90), 
which is then reduced by deducting the amout of “exempt” dividends. On 
the other hand, the answer is “yes” if the analysis is focused on the 
substantive effect of these rules: dividends received by Canadian 
corporations from their FAs are not actually taxed in Canada (whether or 
                                                 
27 Brian J. Arnold, “”Unlinking Tax Treaties and the Foreign Affiliate Rules: A Modest 
Proposal” (2002) vol.50, no.1 Canadian Tax J. 607-29; Wilke et al, supra note 21, 2:27 
(referring to Department of Finance justification for the partial exemption system. 
Whether the foreign country has a treaty with the home country is suggested as a way of 
“limiting” the exemption system in Michael J. Graetz and Paul W. Oosterhuis, 
“Structuring an Exemption System for Foreign Income of U.S. Corporations” (2001) 
Vo.54 National Tax J. 771. 
28 See, for example, Angelo Nikolakakis, “Exempt Surplus: What’s the Problem? A 
Reply to Brian Arnold” (2002) vol.50, no.4 Canadian Tax J. 1354-77. For a detailed 
critique of the US rules, see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. and Robert J. Peroni, “Reinvigorating 
Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its International Dimension,” (2008)  vol.27 Virginia Tax 
Rev. 439. 




not they are exempt dividends). The exemption system is thus a de facto 
norm.29 
 
In terms of fundamental tax principles, the “normative” view is 
defendable. As long as the Income Tax Act recognizes the general 
principle of taxing corporations as separate entities, income earned by a 
corporation is “exempt” from tax at the individual shareholder level until 
dividends are received. The ability-to-pay principle overrides this separate 
entity principle only in cases where the corporation is used as a holding 
vehicle for earning passive income. In general cases, as far as the 
individual shareholder is concerned, corporate business income is 
“exempt” from tax, irrespective of whether the income is earned through a 
foreign corporation.  
 
The exemption system is consistent with the tax entitlement principle. The 
country in which business activities are conducted has clear and 
overwhelming claims over the taxation of such income. In addition to 
providing an enticing business and investment environment, the source 
country’s resources (natural and labour) and market conditions are perhaps 
the economic reasons why Canadian corporations carry on business 
activities in that country. 
 
A “normative” view of the exemption system has implications for the 
design of other outbound tax rules. One example is interest deductibility.  
The current paragraph 20(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act  has been 
interpreted to allow full deduction of interest on money borrowed to earn 
effectively “exempt”, but formally taxable, dividends. Such interpretation 
would be difficult to sustain if dividends are actually exempt as part of the 
normative system. The fungibility of money makes interest expense 
allocation inherently difficult. Assuming interest can be allocated to 
earning dividends from foreign affiliates, the deductibility of such interest 
would need to be justified as a “tax expenditure”.  ground.  
 
 
                                                 
29 Wilke et al, supra note 27. 
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IV. APPROACH TO REFORM    
 
A. MOVING AWAY FROM THE “BATTLE OF NEUTRALITIES” 30 
 
The Consultation Paper recognizes that capital export neutrality (CEN), 
capital import neutrality (CIN) and capital ownership neutrality (CON) 
may influence the choice between an exemption system and a deferral 
with credit system for the taxation of affiliates of Canadian corporations. 
International tax literature has recently been preoccupied with efficiency 
and welfare maximization,31 predominantly from a one-country 
perspective.32  However, it is problematic to regard CEN, CIN and CON 
as key considerations for international tax policy.33 As recognized by the 
Canadian Tax Panel, “fulfilling the three neutrality standards with a single 
                                                 
30 This term is borrowed from Edward D. Kleinbard, “Throw Territorial Taxation from 
the Train”, Tax Notes, February 5, 2007 547-564, at 555. 
31 This is noted by legal scholars, such as J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni and 
Stephen E. Shay, ‘Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-pay Case for 
Taxation Worldwide Income, Florida T. Rev. 5 (2001), 299; and Michael J. Graetz, 
‘Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfied 
policies,’  Brooklyn J. Int’l L 26 (2001), 1357. For an overview of the literature on 
international tax neutrality, see Fadi Shaheen, ‘International Tax Neutrality: 
Reconsiderations,’ Va. Tax Rev. 27 (2007), 203; James R. Hines Jr., ‘The case Against 
Deferral: A Deferential Reconsideration,’ Nat’l Tax J.  52 (1997 385; and Mihir A. Desai 
and James R. Hines Jr., ‘Evaluating International Tax Reform,’ Nat’l Tax J. 56 (2003) 
487. 
32 Professor Michael Graetz remarked in 2001 that “this nation’s international tax policy 
[should instead] be fashioned to advance the interests of the American people”: see 
Graetz, ibid. Professor Shaviro maintains that worldwide welfare should remain a 
normative standard in US international tax policy because capital export neutrality and 
capital import neutrality are, in fact, a tool for promoting national welfare in the broader 
setting of a global prisoner’s dilemma.  See Daniel Shaviro, “Why Worldwide Welfare as 
a Normative Standard in U.S. Tax Policy?”  (2006-2007) 60 Tax Law Review 155. 
33 The CEN generally requires current taxation of foreign income with a full credit for 
foreign taxes paid. To the extent that foreign taxes are less than domestic tax, the tax base 
is shared between the source country and the residence country of the shareholder. CIN 
and CON call for the primary or exclusive taxation of business income in the source 
country. This is often referred to as the “exemption” system or territorial system. In 
practice, no country has adopted a pure credit system or a pure exemption system. The 
mix of the two systems attempts to balance between CEN and CIN/CON.   




set of tax rules is impossible”.34 There are disagreements as to what is 
needed to satisfy CIN or CEN. Traditionally, CEN is considered satisfied 
by the accrual taxation or deferral with credit system,35 and CIN is 
satisfied by the exemption system.36 Recently, some scholars argue that 
exclusive source-based taxation (or territorial taxation) “seems to be a 
theoretically, practically, and politically superior means for achieving 
CEN.”37 The current international consensus is a compromise of CIN and 
CEN. As principles of international taxation, CEN and CIN fail to explain 
the international income tax system that actually exists.38  
 
The conflicts between CIN and CEN cannot be reconciled in the absence 
of harmonization of every country’s tax rates. The Carter Commission 
argues that neutrality requires tax harmonization between nations so that 
each individual is unaffected, from a tax viewpoint, by citizenship, 
residence, and the locations of property, business, and employment.39 Of 
course, such harmonization is possible only if all countries provide the 
same public expenditures mix, finance with the same taxes at the same 
rates, and adjust the taxes simultaneously. Since one of such criteria is 
unlikely to be met in practice and that therefore international neutrality 
cannot be achieved. Even if tax harmonization were possible, the 
Commission notes that ax revenues must still be allocated between source 
                                                 
34  Consultation Paper, supra note 1, at 11. 
35 See Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income, at 121 
(arguing that only unlimited foreign tax credit system satisfies CEN). Others have 
defended the “deferral plus credit” (with limitations) on grounds of CEN. See, for 
example, US Treasury Department, the Deferral of Income Earned Through U.S. 
Controlled Foreign Corporations: A Policy Study (2000), 23-26.   
36 Shaheen, supra note 31. 
37 Ibid, at  225-8. According to Shaheen, the pure residence-based worldwide taxation 
system satisfies CEN only when global uniformity with respect to tax systems is 
achieved. 
38 Michael McIntyre writes: “None of these guidelines [US tax guidelines, including 
worldwide taxation, source taxation, foreign tax credit, etc.] relies on the so-called 
principles of capital export neutrality or capital import neutrality, notwithstanding the 
usual prominence of those principles in discussions of international tax regimes. In my 
view, capital export neutrality is a secondary goal. Neutral treatment of capital flows 
cannot be achieved fully without subversion of the income tax through an exemption for 
capital income. Capital import neutrality is a lobbying position, not a coherent tax policy 
goal.”  See “Guidelines for Taxing International Capital Flows: The Legal Perspective” 
46 National Tax J. 315 (1993), at 318.  
39 Carter Report, supra note 10, vol. 4, at 491-96. 
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and destination countries, and in a world of other distortions international 
neutrality may not be a sensible goal.40  
 
The practical implications of CIN and CEN are not as significant as they 
appear. The apparent difference between deferral with credit system 
(CEN-based) and the exemption system (CIN based) results in little real 
difference where foreign business income is not repatriated (that is, if the 
deferral lasts long enough) because of the time value of money. There is 
little tax revenue generated from foreign business income whether or not 
an exemption or a credit system is used.41 In certain circumstances, the 
credit system produces tax results that are better than the exemption 
system.42  
 
On the one hand, “policy prescriptions under CEN, as well as CIN and 
CON cannot provide production efficient results in all cases” because 
CON and CIN ignore effects of corporate tax-planning on effective tax 
rates and miss the fact that various forms and degrees of income shirting 
will result in different effective tax rates on profits for different competing 
investors.43 On the other hand, the CEN or CIN arguments can justify 
almost any proposal of reform: “[E]vry traditional discussion concludes by 
asserting that whatever policy is being proposed represent a fair balance 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 International Taxation, Report of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation 
(1997), (the “Technical Committee Report), ch.6. For a review of this report, see Nick 
Pantaleo and Scott Wilkie, “Taxing Foreign Business Income,” (1998) Corporate 
Management Conference Report (Canadian Tax Foundation) 8:1-44. 
42  See, for example, Lawrence Lokken, “Territorial Taxation: Why Some U.S. 
Multinationals May Be Less Than Enthusiastic About the Idea (and Some Ideas They 
Really Dislike)” (2006)  Vol.59  S.M.U.L.Rev. 751-72 (discussing why the credit system 
often allows US multinational corporations to achieve US tax results more favorable than 
they could obtain under an exemption system).  Lokken attributes such favorable results 
to the numerous tax minimization techniques used by US corporations, including one 
technique that is used to separate foreign income taxes from income on which those taxes 
were imposed through the use of hybrid entity under the check-the-box rules. 
43 OECD Report on Tax Effects on Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 26, at 18. See 
also Rosanne Altshuler  and  Garry  Grubert,  “Governments and Multinational 
Corporations in the Race to the Bottom,” 41 Tax Notes Int'l 459 (Feb. 6, 2006); Garry 
Grubert and Rosanne Altshuler, “Corporate Taxes in the World Economy: Reforming the 
Taxation of Cross-Border Income,” at ftp://snde.rutgers.edu/Rutgers/wp/2006-26.pdf.  




between those two irreconcilable objectives [CIN and CEN], in every case 
based largely on the author’s preexisting intentions.”44   
 
To the extent that the neutrality theories are helpful at all, their utility is 
largely limited to the choice between the credit system and exemption 
system. As far as Canada is concerned, the option of full credit system 
does not really exist. The CIN/CON or CEN arguments provide little 
insight on the debate on the choice of expanding the current partial 
exemption or full exemption, which is the real debate in Canada at the 
moment.    
 
B. A “PRINCIPLED” APPROACH 
 
A more principled approach will take into account the fundamental 
principles that underlie the apparently complex rules of outbound taxation. 
Such approach can help policy makers navigate among the various, 
sometimes conflicting, policy considerations, including the various 
conflicting neutralities, competitiveness, simplicity, fairness, and practical 
constraints.45 It should also help identify the normative and tax 
expenditure elements of the current system.   
 
In terms of the structure of the Canadian outbound tax system, a principled 
approach would support a simplified, full exemption system and a broader 
accrual system for FAPI.46 Eliminating deferral with credit system will not 
violate any tax principles. It would significantly simplify the outbound tax 
                                                 
44 Kleinbard, supra note 30, at 555. 
45 “Clearly articulated principles” are called for by Alvin C. Warren, Jr., “Commentary” 
(Spring 1991), 9 The American J. of Tax Policy 145-8, at 147-8. 
46 The Consultation Paper is focused on the taxation of Canadian corporations in respect 
of income earned through foreign affiliates, namely active business income and FAPI.  
With respect to active business income, the Consultation Paper lists four alternative 
choices in how the income is taxed in the parent company’s country: accrual or 
worldwide basis of taxation; deferral with credit; partial exemption and partial deferral 
with credit (the “Canadian system”); and full exemption. The Consultation Paper 
suggests moving towards the full exemption system, and acknowledges that “there 
appears to be little debate that taxing FAPI on an accrual basis is appropriate”: 
Consultation Paper, supra note 1, at 2.43. 
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system as it would be unnecessary to compute the surplus accounts and 
track foreign taxes underlying the dividends. As discussed above, the 
difference between “partial exemption” and “partial deferral with credit” 
within the Canadian system is more formal than real. There is little real 
difference between the current exemption and credit system from the point 
of tax revenue collected in Canada. There are no clear “principled” 
justifications for the partial deferral with credit system: the ability-to-pay 
principle is no more satisfied by the credit than the exemption system; the 
tax entitlement principle that underlies Canada’s cession of tax jurisdiction 
to the foreign country does not distinguish between treaty or non-treaty 
countries; and the separate entity principle is applicable outside the FAPI 
system. 
   
Assuming that both the exemption regime and accrual regime apply to 
foreign affiliates (i.e., by eliminating the “control” requirement in the 
accrual regime), there is really nothing beyond accrual taxation of FAPI 
and exempt treatment of dividends. As far as Canadian tax policy is 
concerned, the key is to define and protect the Canadian tax base in such a 
manner that the tax rules do not distort investment location choices.  
 
C. POLICY CONCERNS  
 
A full exemption system does not represent a major shift in Canada’s tax 
structure or policy for the reasons discussed earlier. Nonetheless, concerns 
can be raised over the possibility that it will result in further erosion of the 
Canadian tax base and relocation of domestic operations to countries with 
lower taxes.   
 
The concern with relocating investment to foreign low-tax jurisdictions 
already exists.  The current partial exemption system already covers some 
well-known low-tax jurisdictions, such as Barbados. In fact, Barbados is 
the 3rd largest recipient of Canadian outflow foreign direct investment 
(FDI).47 On the other hand, more than half of Canadian outbound FDI in 
                                                 
47 Canadian Foreign Direct Investment Abroad, by Top-10 Destinations, 2006 (Billions 
CAD): United States (42.7%), UK (11.3), Barbados (7.3%), Ireland (4.7%), France 
(3.2%), Bermuda (3%), Netherlands (2.3%), Hungary (1.9%), Australia (1.8) and 
Germany (1.8%). Source: Statistics Canada, International investment position, Canadian 




2006 was in the United States (42.7%) and United Kingdom (11.3), which 
are “high-tax” countries.  
 
It is difficult to estimate the extent to which a full exemption system 
would have on the outbound FDI flows. It is unclear about whether the 
Canadian outbound FDI is a substitute or complement for domestic 
investments. To the extend that Canadian outbound FDI is made for non-
tax reasons, such as accessing lower costs, natural resources, or local 
market, the FDI is arguably not substituting domestic investment. To the 
extent that FDI substitutes for domestic investment and it is driven by 
Canadian tax reasons, then, the issue is serious. Empirical research is 
needed.48 
 
A related concern is the further loss of the tax base. Arguably, the current 
“deferral with credit” (or taxable dividends) regime does not really 
produce much tax revenue in Canada. As such, a move to a full exemption 
will not further erode the Canadian tax base. That does not mean, 
however, that base erosion is not a serious concern. The fact that Barbados 
is the third largest recipient of Canadian FDI clearly indicates the “tax” 
motivation behind the initial choice of destination.    
 
A further related concern is the “race-to-the-bottom” international tax 
competition. Because a full exemption system would leave the taxation of 
corporate non-FAPI profit to be determined solely by the source country, 
FDI host countries would compete in lowering the tax burden in order to 
attract FDI. It is controversial whether such competition is effective in 
actually affecting the FDI location decisions or economically efficient.49  
Assuming that host-country tax competition to attract foreign “direct” 
investment is a reality, which may be defendable on ground of national tax 
                                                                                                                         
direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in Canada, by country, annual 
(dollars), CANSIM Table 376-0051. This data is reproduced in Competition Policy 
Review Panel, Consultation Paper, “Sharpenning Canada’s Competitive Edge”, (2008)  
http://www.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/cprp-gepmc.nsf/en/00013e.html. 
48 This is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of this Article. There is some 
research indicating the U.S. outbound FDI complements domestic investment and 
employment.See R. Glenn Hubbard, “Tax Policy and International Competitiveness”,  
The Tax Magazine, Vol. 82, No.3, March 2004.   
49 See OECD Report on Tax Effects on Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 26. 
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sovereignty,50 a full exemption system would not be problematic. It would 
allow FDI host countries, especially low-income developing countries, to 
use their tax policy as an instrument for promoting FDI and economic 
development.51 On the other hand, a full exemption system, if not 
complemented by an effective accrual system, may promote “harmful” tax 
competition in respect of “mobile” investment.   
  
V. DESIGNING THE EXEMPTION SYSTEM 
 
This Article argues that a full exemption could be viewed as part of the 
normative outbound tax system as opposed to a tax expenditure. Under 
this view, Canada cedes its jurisdiction to tax a Canadian corporation 
receiving dividends from a foreign affiliate in a way not dissimilar to 
dividends received by a Canadian corporation from its Canadian 
subsidiary. The Canadian cession of tax jurisdiction can be unconditional 
as long as the distinction between “direct” and “portfolio” investment is 
maintained.  Other than the rules defining “foreign affiliate,” the rules for 
tracking the amounts in support of the distinction between “taxable” 





                                                 
50 The tax sovereignty of the FDI host country presumably includes the right to use tax 
policy to attract FDI, as long as it does not constitute “harmful” tax competition. In an 
ideal world, a “tax-neutral” system adopted by capital exporting countries would 
discourage FDI host countries (especially developing countries) from engaging in tax 
competition; see Grubert and Altshuler, supra note 41. In reality, many developing 
countries use tax incentives to entice FDI. Under certain conditions, the tax incentives 
can be effective in attracting FDI. For a case study of China, see Jinyan Li, “The Rise and 
Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for International Tax Debates,” (2007) v. 
8 Florida Tax Rev. 670. 
51 To the extent that a FID host country is not in a position to use tax policy effectively 
(e.g., offer tax incentives that do not actually affect the location decision of investors or 
tax incentives were abused by taxpayers), a full exemption system does nothing to assist 
the host country. There are also inter-nation equity implications when the tax incentives 
result in a “reverse” distribution of tax base from a low-income country to a high-income 
country. Presumably, such inter-nation “inequity” is more serious under a “credit” system 
than an “exemption” system. See Li, ibid. 




A. ELIGIBLE TAXPAYERS 
 
The proposed full exemption system would apply to Canadian resident 
corporations, not individuals, receiving dividends from a “foreign 
affiliate”. Excluding individuals from the system is necessary under the 
ability-to-pay principle. Individual shareholders of a resident corporation 
will be taxable on the dividends paid out of the foreign income earned by 
the corporation. The “exemption” system is thus limited at the corporate 
level only.  
  
B. ELIGIBLE FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 
 
The definition of “foreign affiliate” can be revised to reflect “genuine” 
foreign direct investment. A 10% voting rights or value threshold would 
be consistent with international tax norms and similar to the threshold for 
distinguishing between direct and portfolio investment in a domestic 
context (i.e. Part IV of the Income Tax Act).  This Article also 
recommends lowering the threshold for FAPI taxation to 10%.  As such, 
there is a built-in “anti-avoidance” mechanism so that the “FA” status 
would not be used as a means of avoiding Canadian tax. 
 
C. ELIGIBLE FOREIGN INCOME  
 
The current partial exemption system is generally limited to active 
business income earned by a FA in a treaty country. The characterization 
of income as “active business income” is thus a crucial building block.52  
FAPI is implicitly excluded. So is income that is neither FAPI, nor active 
business income.  Under a proposed full exemption system, there is no 
need to define “active business income.”  From Canadian tax policy 
                                                 
52 Exempt surplus account also includes  inter-affiliate dividends traced to exempt 
surplus, tax-free portion of capital gains, as well as taxable capital gains from the 
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perspective, what is important is the accrual taxation of FAPI. Non-FAPI 
is subject to territorial taxation.53 
 
D. BRANCHES   
 
The exemption treatment should be extended to non-FAPI income earned 
by Canadian corporations through a foreign branch. This makes sense 
where the territorial taxation of business income is accepted as a 
normative rule and there is no sound policy why this rule should be 
overruled on ground of ability-to-pay.  Including branches in the 
exemption system is unlikely to erode Canadian tax base. If the business is 
carried on a country with a comparable tax system, the business income 
will not attract any Canadian tax because of the foreign tax credit. In the 
case of business losses, they will not be deducted for Canadian tax 
purposes. 
 
E. UNLINKING FROM TAX TREATIES 
 
There would be no need to link the exemption system to tax treaties. The 
issue of low-tax jurisdictions can be addressed through a re-designed 
FAPI.  
 
F. OTHER RETURNS FROM FOREIGN AFFILIATES  
 
This paper suggests that all dividends received by Canadian corporations 
from their foreign affiliates are exempt from Canadian tax. If the return on 
equity investment is exempt from tax, a logical question is whether other 
returns (e.g., royalties and interest) are also exempt from Canadian tax. 
This question raises a tax neutrality issue as it is biased in favor of equity 
investment.   
 
                                                 
53 However, should the redesigned exemption system remain “partial” and some 
dividends from foreign affiliates remain taxable in Canada, rules similar to the present 
characterization rules and “surplus” accounting rules would be required.    




On the other hand, the taxation of royalties and interest and non-taxation 
of dividends in Canada is arguably consistent with the tax entitlement 
principle. Assuming that the foreign tax law is similar to the Income Tax 
Act, interest and royalty payments are deductible in computing income, 
thereby not taxed in that country. The Canadian corporate investor has 
presumably incurred research and development expenses in developing the 
property licensed to foreign affiliates, Canada is entitled to tax the royalty 
income.  However, in the absence of specific, new, base-protection rules, 
Canadian developed intangibles can be transferred offshore so that future 
royalties will be sheltered from Canadian taxation.   
  
VI. REDESIGNING THE ACCRUAL SYSTEM  
A. TARGETED INCOME - “FAPI” 
 
The current definition of “FAPI” is intended to capture income that that 
has no nexus to business activity, is highly mobile and easily shifted to 
low or no tax jurisdictions. More specifically, FAPI includes:  
• passive income from property;  
• income from a business that is not really “active”, which is 
determined by either the speculative, isolated nature of the activity, 
or the main source of income being investment;   
• income from “mobile” business activities, such as services54 and 
sales or trading;55 
• income that is actually originated from Canada, but deflected to a 
foreign jurisdiction.56 
 
The FAPI definition also includes, in very simple terms, taxable capital 
gains on the sale of assets not used in active business and on the sale of 
shares of affiliates who do not carry on active business. Inter-affiliate 
payments of investment income do not give rise to FAPI as long as the 
underlying nature of the income of the group is active (measured by, for 
                                                 
54 S.95(2)(b) of ITA. 
55 S.95(2)(a.1) of ITA. 
56 S.95(2)(a.2), (a.3) and (a.4) of ITA. 
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example, the deduction of the payment in computing active business 
income). 
 
The current definition with respect to “mobile” income is generally sound. 
It can be expanded to include more services and sales income. With 
respect to capital gains, it is worth considering an alternative that FAPI 
specifically includes taxable capital gains on the sale of assets that produce 
FAPI and shares whose value is attributable to appreciation of passive 
assets.  
 
B. TARGETED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 
 
Under the current rules, FAPI earned by a foreign corporation is taxable to 
a resident shareholder (individual or corporation) only in cases where the 
foreign corporation is “controlled” by the resident (i.e., owning sufficient 
votes, generally 50%, to elect a majority of the board)57 or if the foreign 
corporation is a foreign investment entity.  
 
In theory, all FAPI should arguably be subject to accrual tax. In practice, if 
a resident taxpayer cannot compel the foreign corporation to provide 
sufficient information on the computation of FAPI and the underlying 
foreign taxes, it would be difficult for the taxpayer to comply with the 
rules. The “control” test was originally adopted largely to accommodate 
this practical concern. However, it is questionable whether the “control” 
test is still necessary at present. Canadian corporations enjoy the 
exemption treatment in respect of dividends received from their “foreign 
affiliates”. The definition of “foreign affiliate” requires, in general terms, 
10% ownership of equity investment. In order to qualify for the 
exemption, Canadian corporations must compute the surplus amounts of 
each of the foreign affiliate, which presumably requires a great deal of 
information. The 10% test does not seem to be a problem. Moreover, the 
FIE regime imposes accrual tax on income from portfolio investments 
                                                 
57 “Controlled foreign affiliate” is defined under s.95(1) of the ITA. “Control” means “de 
jure” control: See, eg., Duha Printers (Western) Ltd. V. M.N.R., [1998] 3 C.T.C. 303, 98 
D.T.C. 6334 (S.C.C.). 




irrespective of the shareholder’s ownership percentage. A lower threshold 
of 10% or 25% is used or proposed58 in some other countries.59 
 
C. SAFE HARBOURS 
 
In order to simplify compliance, the threshold for exemption from the 
FAPI system can be raised. Another approach might be to exempt a 
foreign corporation’s FAPI from tax if the FAPI is below a defined 
percentage (say 5%) of its total income.60  
  
VII. OTHER BASE-PROTECTION RULES   
 
In addition to FAPI accrual rules, Canada needs to introduce rules that 
allocate income and expenses to income earned in Canada and income 
earned in foreign countries. Since only foreign income of a foreign 
affiliate is eligible for the exemption treatment, in the absence of effective 
source rules, the exemption system would erode the domestic tax base as a 
result of income shifting.  
 
A. EXPENSE ALLOCATION  
 
The need for better allocation rules exists under the current system. A 
broader exemption system adds more pressure. One of the controversial 
expenses is interest. In principle, interest expenses incurred to earn taxable 
income (e.g., FAPI, domestic income, and foreign direct income) are 
                                                 
58 10% was discussed in the UK HM Treasury Report, “Taxation of Companies’ Foreign 
Profits: Discussion Document” (2007), at 4.16. 25% is mentioned in the New Zealand’s 
International Tax Review: A Direction for Change: A Government Discussion 
Document” (2006), at 5.26. 
59 For more discussion, see Brian J. Arnold, “Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules, 
Harmful Tax Competition, and International Taxation,” in 2000 World Tax Conference 
Report, Report of the Proceedings of the First World Tax Conference: Taxes without 
Borders (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2000) 17:1-26 at 7. 
60 This is the rule in Australia, and proposed in the New Zealand Report, supra note 58, 
5.11. 
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deductible, whereas interest expenses incurred to earn “exempt” income 
are not.  The challenge is how to allocate interest expenses among the 
different categories of income and whether interest deductible should be 
used as a tax subsidy to Canadian companies in respect of their foreign 




In the case of intangibles, where a Canadian company developed an 
intangible in Canada and then transfers it to a holding entity in a low-tax 
jurisdiction, which then licenses it to related foreign affiliates in other 
countries, the Canadian tax base can be eroded as a result of:  
 
• deductions of research and development costs;  
• no gain on the transfer of the intangible to offshore when the fair 
market value at that time does not exceed the cost;  
• there is no deemed royalty to the Canadian developer after the 
transfer; and  
• the royalty earned offshore is deemed not to be FAPI.   
 
The valuation rules and transfer pricing rules can presumably be applied to 
address the base-erosion issue. Abolishing the inter-affiliate non-FAPI 
deeming rule is not a complete solution because part of the royalty is 
likely earned offshore and should not be taxed in Canada.  An alternative 
solution is a new “income source” rule and expense allocation rule for 
intangibles. The Canadian developer can be deemed to continue to own 
the intangibles even when the “legal” title has been transferred to the 
foreign affiliate.   
                                                 
61 There has been a great deal of debate on interest deductibility in Canada. For some 
recent literature, see Sandra Slaats, “Financing Foreign Affiliates: An Overview of the 
Canadian Proposals and the Rules in Selected Countries,” (2007) vol.55, No.3 Canadian 
Tax J. 676; Tamaki, P.K. 2004. “Policy Forum: Thoughts on the Deductibility of Interest 
and Other Expenses.” (2004) col.52 Canadian Tax J. 1121. For some international 
literature, see Shaviro, D. 2001. “Does More Sophisticated Mean Better? A Critique of 
Alternative Approaches to Sourcing the Interest Expense of U.S. Multinationals.” 54 Tax 
L. Rev. 353. 
 





VIII. CONCLUSIONS  
 
This Article supports the move to a full exemption system and 
recommends an enhanced FAPI accrual system to complement it. In the 
absence of meaningful accrual system and income and expense allocation 
rules, a full exemption system would result in non-taxation of Canadian 
income shifted abroad, especially income shifted to low-tax jurisdictions. 
 
